Topics explored in this series include the history and practice of international law (including sources of international law, Indigenous treaties, international treaty diplomacy, subnational treaty making, domestic reception of international law and Parliament's role in international law), as well as Canada's role in international law, governance and innovation in the broad fields of international economic, environmental and intellectual property law. Topics with an economic law focus include international trade, dispute settlement, international taxation and private international law. Environmental law topics include the international climate change regime and international treaties on chemicals and waste, transboundary water governance and the law of the sea. Intellectual property law topics explore the development of international IP protection and the integration of IP law into the body of international trade law. Finally, the series presents Canadian perspectives on developments in international human rights and humanitarian law, including judicial implementation of these obligations, international labour law, business and human rights, international criminal law, war crimes, and international legal issues related to child soldiers. This series allows a reflection on Canada's role in the community of nations and its potential to advance the progressive development of global rule of law. 
About the International Law Research Program
The International Law Research Program (ILRP) at CIGI is an integrated multidisciplinary research program that provides leading academics, government and private sector legal experts, as well as students from Canada and abroad, with the opportunity to contribute to advancements in international law.
The ILRP strives to be the world's leading international law research program, with recognized impact on how international law is brought to bear on significant global issues. The program's mission is to connect knowledge, policy and practice to build the international law framework -the globalized rule of law -to support international governance of the future. Its founding belief is that better international governance, including a strengthened international law framework, can improve the lives of people everywhere, increase prosperity, ensure global sustainability, address inequality, safeguard human rights and promote a more secure world.
The ILRP focuses on the areas of international law that are most important to global innovation, prosperity and sustainability: international economic law, international intellectual property law and international environmental law. In its research, the ILRP is attentive to the emerging interactions among international and transnational law, Indigenous law and constitutional law. This paper will begin with a historical review of Canada's role in the development of international criminal law from the post-World War II prosecutions to the late 1980s. It will turn to an examination of Canada's engagement with international criminal law from the early 1990s to the present, explained through Canada's international actions on the ICC and other international institutions. This description will demonstrate that, over the past two decades, Canada has been deeply involved in the development and implementation of international criminal law abroad, providing legal, financial and political support to particular tribunals at particular periods. However, this support has shifted over time, leaving gaps in the substantive commitment. The paper will then discuss Canada's engagement with international criminal law at home, in particular through Canada's passage of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2 (CAHWCA) in 2000. The adoption of the CAHWCA reflected a high point in the domestic implementation of international The first Canadian war crimes legislation, the War Crimes Act, 3 was adopted in 1946, largely to provide jurisdiction to Canadian military tribunals based in post-World War II occupied Europe and Asia. Canada was quite active in the period immediately after the war, investigating 171 cases of war crimes and prosecuting seven individuals in Canadian military tribunals in Aurich, Germany. 4 The most well-known trial was that of Kurt Meyer, who was prosecuted for, and convicted of, ordering the execution of Canadian prisoners of war.
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5 There were also trials of escaped prisoners of war in Alberta.
6 By 1948, Canadian troops had been repatriated and criminal prosecution files were transferred to Britain, which "marked the end of Canada's active contribution to the handling of Nazi war criminals." 7 After However, this position changed in 1980. At that time, Robert Kaplan -who had, as a member of Parliament, introduced a private member's bill in 1978 on the prosecution of war criminals, due to the growing concern that Canada was a haven for war criminals -became solicitor general.
12
He created an interdepartmental committee to examine the issue and contacted foreign countries with an interest in requesting extradition of alleged war criminals present in Canada.
13 As a result of these activities, a new Canadian approach was adopted to address the issue of the presence of Nazi war criminals in Canada.
14 In 1982, Canada agreed to extradite Albert Helmut Rauca, a German-born Canadian citizen, to the Federal Republic of Germany to face charges that he had aided and abetted the murder of 10,500 Jewish persons in Lithuania as a member of a Schutzstaffel (SS) security unit. 15 The Ontario Court of Appeal found that, while the extradition request violated Rauca's Charter 16 right to enter, remain and leave Canada, the violation was saved by section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law.
17 Rauca was extradited 8 Ibid; Currie & Rikhof, supra note 6 at 238.
9 Lafontaine, supra note 7 at 19; Deschênes Commission, supra note 5 at 27.
10 Deschênes Commission, supra note 5 at 31-33.
11 Ibid at 28.
12 Ibid at 29.
13 Ibid.
14 Lafontaine, supra note 8 at 20. Criminal Code 23 to allow for the prosecution and punishment of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in World War II and after. 24 The commission also recommended that immigration and citizenship laws be amended to allow for revocation of citizenship and expulsion of those who lied to immigration authorities about their links to serious international crimes. 25 The second, confidential, part of the commission's report provided an analysis of 29 specific cases considered to contain grave allegations of war crimes and listed suspects. 26 The public portion of the report recommended that the government pursue criminal prosecutions in these cases, and to examine the possibility of doing the same in 220 other cases. 27 In connection with the Mengele issue that prompted the inquiry, the commission found that Mengele did not apply for a visa to enter Canada and had never entered Canada.
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In 1987, Bill C-71, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Immigration Act, 1976 and the Citizenship Act, was passed, providing legal jurisdiction and the political impetus for criminal prosecution of war crimes. 29 The Department of Justice and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) created specialized war crimes units.
30
The first case brought under these amendments was against Imre Finta, who was accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes, due to his role in detaining and deporting to death 8,617 Jewish persons while he was a commander of the Gendarmerie in Hungary during World 23 RSC 1985, c C-46. 24 Deschênes Commission, supra note 4 at 6-7.
25 Ibid at 7-11. 34 The SCC also accepted the defences of superior orders and mistake of fact as submitted to the jury, implicitly accepting the use of hate propaganda in the creation and implementation of those superior orders (referred to by John McManus as the "I believed the hate propaganda" defence).
35
As well, the SCC imposed a double burden on the prosecution to prove both the international offence and the Canadian offence.
36 As a result of these findings, the SCC's Finta judgment essentially stopped the federal government from using criminal prosecutions to address serious international crimes, forcing the government to focus instead on administrative remedies of exclusion, denaturalization and deportation.
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While the Finta case was progressing through the various court levels, three other criminal cases were launched. In 1989, Michael Pawlowski was charged with eight counts of murder as a crime against humanity and a war crime for his role in the death of approximately 400 Jewish persons in 1942 in a section of Poland that later became part of the Republic of Belarus. 38 The prosecution applied to take commission evidence from 12 31 R v Finta, [1994] 1 SCR 701 at 725-26 [Finta] . witnesses in the Soviet Union and West Germany, but these requests were dismissed as prejudicing the rights of the accused to a fair trial. 39 The Crown was unable to persuade the witnesses to travel to Canada to testify, dropped the charges and was required to contribute to the accused's legal costs. 40 Another criminal case involved Stephen Reistetter, who was charged with the persecution and deportation of approximately 1,000 Jewish persons from the former Czechoslovakia. 41 His case was stayed, due to the death and illness of crucial witnesses.
42 A final unsuccessful prosecution was that of R v Grujicic, launched in 1994 and dropped in 2004, due to the defendant's illness. 43 In contrast to the lack of success in criminal prosecutions in Finta, Pawlowski, Reistetter and Grujicic, administrative proceedings were successful in the case of Jacob Luitjens. The Federal Court of Canada found that Luitjens, originally from the Netherlands, had fraudulently obtained his Canadian citizenship because he had concealed that he had worked for the Nederlandsche Landwacht (Dutch Land Guard), which had collaborated with the Gestapo and had detained and tortured individuals. 44 In 1948, a Dutch court had convicted Luitjens in absentia for "aiding and abetting the enemy in time of war" and sentenced him to life in prison.
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Luitjens' Canadian citizenship was revoked; he was deported to the Netherlands, and he served his sentence (which was reduced). The 1990s were a time of rapid development in the field of international criminal law, prompted by the creation of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, respectively. 47 Canada was engaged in these developments, both through its diplomatic presence at the United Nations in New York, 48 and through assistance provided to these tribunals as a result of tribunal requests. 49 However, the most far-reaching contribution to the field of international criminal law of Canada during the 1990s was the result of Canada's involvement in the drafting and adoption of the Rome Statute.
Canada's leadership on the ICC was directly linked to the rise of then-Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and the human security agenda, which attempted to shift the focus within the international community from the protection of state sovereignty to protection of civilians. 50 In 1995, discussions began at the United Nations on an ICC statute, based on a draft created by the International Law Commission. Canada began its leadership role by coordinating and chairing a group of like-minded states (the like-minded group) to advance the negotiations toward the adoption of an ICC statute: by the end of 1995, the like-minded group had grown from an initial handful to 20 states. 51 From 1996 to 1998, these discussions intensified into preparatory negotiations, which focused on crafting a widely acceptable draft ICC statute. During this time, the like-minded group grew to include nearly 60 states, including many from Latin America, Africa and Asia.
52 Canada at first urged, and then actively assisted, the likeminded group in its adoption of substantive, shared cornerstone positions around which proposals were made and strategizing took place.
53
During this period, Canada focused on "negotiating up from principle," trying to avoid descent to the lowest common denominator. 54 It also adopted a five-pronged approach to raising support for an ICC: deep involvement in all aspects of the negotiations, public statements, diplomatic lobbying, financial support and cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).
55 First, Canadian diplomats and lawyers were deeply involved in virtually every aspect of the negotiations on a draft ICC statute, presenting proposals and commenting on and coordinating formal and informal discussions aimed at resolving differences of opinion among states. Second, Axworthy and Canadian officials publicly supported the creation of an independent and effective ICC through statements and speeches. Third, Axworthy, Canadian parliamentarians and Canadian officials undertook pro-ICC lobbying efforts, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in capitals and at the United Nations.
56 Fourth, Canada provided financial assistance to the United Nations trust fund to enable least-developed countries to participate in ICC negotiations and assisted the participation by NGOs of least-developed countries. 57 Fifth, Canada had a proactive relationship with NGOs, meeting regularly with Canadian and international NGOs, including the rapidly growing Coalition for an ICC, to share views and information.
58
The preparatory ICC negotiations culminated in a five-week diplomatic conference from June 15 to July 17, 1998, in Rome. Canada's approach shifted somewhat to accommodate the new role of senior Canadian diplomat Philippe Kirsch, who was appointed to chair the pivotal Committee of the Whole negotiating body. 59 This led Canada to pass the chair of the like-minded group to Australia, 60 although Canada remained active throughout the conference in growing and consolidating the efforts of that group. "The Canadian delegation played a brokering role in all areas of the negotiations -the definition of crimes, jurisdiction, general principles, procedures, and the structure of the institution -by bridging gaps and finding creative ways to address legitimate concerns while maintaining a By the end of the diplomatic conference, there were certain divisive issues that could not be resolved through negotiations -for example, the scope of the court's jurisdiction, the definition of certain crimes and the prosecutor's ability to initiate an investigation. Kirsch and the bureau of coordinators prepared a final package proposal to balance these views where possible. The package was accepted by the vast majority of states and the Rome Statute was adopted.
63 After the final adoption of the statute, Axworthy referred to the statute's "delicate balance," and indicated that he hoped that those states that were hesitant about the court would have their concerns allayed once it began its operations.
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After the 1998 adoption of the Rome Statute, Canada's focus shifted to making the ICC a reality. Domestically, the departments of foreign affairs and justice were tasked with drafting Canadian legislation to quickly implement the Rome Statute into domestic law, explained below. This domestic action allowed Canada to become the fourteenth country to ratify the Rome Statute on July 7, 2000.
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Internationally, Canada pursued a dual diplomatic track. First, it continued its strong leadership role in the subsequent ICC-related negotiations to draft the court's rules of procedure and evidence, elements of crimes and other subsidiary documents. Given his deft handling of the Rome negotiations, Kirsch was again approved to chair these negotiations. In addition, Canada remained involved in the like- Under the 2006-2015 Conservative governments, Canada's role with respect to the ICC underwent a shift. Canada remained actively involved in the ICC Assembly of States Parties, but became known primarily for its strong promotion of a "zero nominal growth" budget, leading to views that Canada's earlier broad-based leadership on international criminal justice had waned or was waning. 73 In terms of rhetoric, Canada no longer concentrated on international criminal justice within the promotion of human security writ large and instead focused on how the ICC could contribute to the rule of law and accountability in specific countries of press for unity in support of the ICC. 79 In Canada's statement at the 2016 ICC Assembly of States Parties, the minister argued that " [w] e need more of the International Criminal Court, not less" and recommended the assembly as a forum to continue dialogue with states expressing concerns about the ICC. 80 Canada has re-engaged in the judicial election process by nominating a well-qualified candidate, Kimberly Prost, for the 2017 ICC judicial elections. It is worth mentioning that, apart from Canada's governmental support for international criminal justice, Canadians were and are represented within contemporary international criminal justice institutions, including at the highest levels. For example, as mentioned above, Kirsch served as the first president of the ICC, and the deputy prosecutor of the ICC is currently James Stewart. There are also many others not mentioned in this list who have served within offices of the prosecutor and registries of international criminal tribunals, or as defence counsel to accused at the tribunals.
The next section will turn to a consideration of Canada's role in the development of international criminal law through the country's domestic legislative, judicial and administrative actions.
Canada and the Development of International Criminal Law at the Domestic Level
After Canada's contributions to the drafting of the Rome Statute and the creation of the ICC, Canada's second most far-reaching contribution to the field of international criminal law has been the adoption of key domestic legislation through the CAHWCA.
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The CAHWCA was introduced in Parliament on International Human Rights Day, December 10, 1999, to underscore the role of the ICC, and of ICCsupportive states, in ending impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
88 It received royal assent on June 24, 2000. 89 On passage of the CAHWCA, Canada became the first country in the world to incorporate the obligations of the Rome Statute into its national laws. 90 Canada ratified the Rome Statute shortly after, on July 7, 2000.
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The CAHWCA had two main goals, the first of which was to implement Canada's obligations under the Rome Statute to ensure its ability to cooperate fully with investigations and prosecutions by the ICC. 92 The second goal was to "re-energize Canada's ability to prosecute core crimes committed both domestically and abroad." 93 In other words, the CAHWCA was aimed at correcting the challenges created by the SCC's 1994 Finta judgment and to fill gaps in the law.
The CAHWCA addresses eight different themes: crimes, jurisdiction, defences, sentences, offences against the administration of justice of the ICC, proceeds of crimes offences, the creation of a Crimes Against Humanity Fund, extradition and mutual legal assistance. Each of these themes will be described in turn.
The CAHWCA criminalizes genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as domestic crimes based on treaty and customary international law, including the Rome Statute. 94 Additionally, it adds a new offence of breach of command or superior responsibility. 95 The CAHWCA incorporated into domestic law the international law definitions of the offences. In this manner, the definitions are flexible because they evolve as the international definitions evolve, thereby eliminating the need to amend Canadian law as international law changes.
96
The definitions meet the principle of legality by adapting to the international law offences in place at the time of the crime. 97 However, this flexibility also means that, in every case, the trial judge will need to determine the exact definition of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes applicable at the time period specified in the charges.
98
The CAHWCA adds some clarity to the definitions by specifying that, for crimes occurring after July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute's definitions of crimes are a sort of "minimum baseline for courts to draw on in constructing a definition in a particular case."
99
The CAHWCA also indicates that crimes against humanity were part of customary international law or were criminal under general principles of international law prior to "(a) the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, signed at London on August 8, 1945; and (b) the Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated January 19, 1946." 100 This was meant to clarify a point raised by the SCC in Finta, forestalling any defence attempts to relitigate the question of whether crimes against humanity were criminal under customary international law during the World War II era.
101
The CAHWCA sets out several grounds of jurisdiction for offences committed within and outside of Canada. For offences committed within Canada, the CAHWCA establishes territorial jurisdiction.
102
The temporal jurisdiction for these offences is prospective only, applying to crimes committed after the entry into force of the CAHWCA.
103
For offences committed outside of Canada, the CAHWCA provides jurisdiction based on the nationality principle ("the person was a Canadian citizen or was employed by Canada in a civilian or military capacity," "was a citizen of a state that was engaged in an armed conflict against Canada" or "was employed in a civilian or military capacity by such a state") and the passive personality principle ("the victim...was a Canadian citizen" or "a citizen of a state allied with Canada in an armed conflict"). 104 The CAHWCA also provides for universal jurisdiction for crimes committed by any individual subsequently present in Canada, regardless of the individual's nationality or of where the crimes were committed. 105 The temporal jurisdiction for these offences is both prospective and retrospective.
106
Both Canadian and international defences are available to accused persons under the amendments set out in the CAHWCA, which contributes to respect for the rights of the accused. However, the CAHWCA makes it clear that it is not a defence that "an offence was committed in obedience to or in conformity with the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission."
107 Additionally, the CAHWCA indicates that an accused cannot base his or her defence of superior orders on "a belief that an order was lawful if the belief was based on information about a civilian population or an identifiable group of persons that encouraged, was likely to encourage or attempted to justify the commission of inhumane acts or omissions against the population or group." 108 This amendment directly reversed the "I believed the hate propaganda" defence of Finta mentioned above.
The CAHWCA indicates that those convicted of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes "shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, if an intentional killing forms the basis of the offence" or can be sentenced for a term up to life, in any other case. 109 The CAHWCA contains a number of offences against the administration of justice of the ICC. These offences include obstruction of justice, obstruction of officials, bribery of judges and officials, perjury, fabrication or provision of contradictory evidence and intimidation.
110 They cover all persons inside of Canada, and Canadians who commit these offences outside of Canada.
111
These sections of the CAHWCA represent a crucial aspect of implementation of the Rome Statute, as they allow Canada to cooperate with the ICC on matters central to the protection of the integrity of the ICC's proceedings. The CAHWCA also sets out offences for possessing or laundering proceeds obtained from genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
112
The Rome Statute broke new ground by providing for the creation of the Trust Fund for Victims, 113 something that had never been done before in an international criminal tribunal. The trust fund has a two-fold mandate: first, to implement courtordered reparations and, second, to provide physical, psychological and material support to victims and their families.
114 Canada responded to this in the CAHWCA through provision for the Crimes against Humanity Fund.
115 Money obtained through the enforcement in Canada of the ICC's orders for reparations, fines or forfeitures, as well as through the disposal of forfeited assets, is to be paid into this fund. 116 The Attorney General of Canada may then make payments from that fund to the ICC's trust fund or to the victims of offences under the CAHWCA.
117 This fund must be established via federal regulations, 118 but this has not yet occurred.
The CAHWCA also obliges Canada to arrest and surrender persons sought by the ICC for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and makes clear that surrender is different from state-to-state extradition. 119 That said, most procedures of the Extradition Act 120 apply to individuals who are the subject of a surrender request by the ICC, except that the person is not able to claim immunity, and grounds of refusal for extraditions do not apply in cases of surrender. The CAHWCA allows Canada to cooperate with the ICC in its investigations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in a manner similar to that of providing mutual legal assistance to foreign states. The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 122 was amended to permit Canada to assist the ICC through enforcement of ICC orders for restraint, search, seizure, reparation, forfeiture and fines, as well as questioning, production of records or things and other forms of evidence collection.
123
As Canada was the first country in the world to adopt comprehensive legislation implementing the Rome Statute, many other states looked to Canada to provide insights into its experience in drafting and passing this legislation. As a result, through its ICC and Accountability Campaign, Canada sponsored the creation and global dissemination of a manual on the implementation of the Rome Statute into domestic law.
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The ratification of the Rome Statute and the CAHWCA prompted changes within Canada in its domestic application of international criminal law. It became clear that Canada needed to shift its focus beyond World War II crimes to crimes committed, for example, in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda and elsewhere. To this end, Canada revised the War Crimes Program in 1998 to be an interdepartmental initiative between the Department of Justice, the RCMP and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, with the Canada Border Services Agency joining on its inception in 2003. 125 The purpose of the program was -and still is -to support Canada's policy of denying safe haven to persons believed to have committed or to have been complicit in genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, and to contribute to the international and domestic fight against impunity.
126 Additionally, the program is involved in responding to requests from international criminal tribunals for assistance from Canada. The War Crimes Program takes two approaches to apply its "no safe haven" purpose: criminal prosecutions and administrative remedies. The program views criminal investigations and prosecutions of those suspected of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as "sending a strong message to Canadians and the international community that the Government of Canada does not tolerate impunity" for these crimes. 127 In 2005, Munyaneza, a Rwandan national living in Canada, was charged under the CAHWCA with two counts of genocide through intentional killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm to Tutsi, two counts of crimes against humanity through intentional murder and sexual violence against Tutsi civilians and three counts of war crimes through intentional murder, sexual violence and pillage for acts committed in 1994 in Butare.
128 He was charged on the basis of the universal jurisdiction provision in the CAHWCA, due to his presence in Canada. On October 29, 2009, Munyaneza was sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole for 25 years. 129 The Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction in 2014. 130 Leave to appeal was denied by the SCC.
131 These judgments represent a high point in Canadian criminal law on the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, based on international criminal law standards. Unfortunately, they currently represent the only high point in this regard.
On November 6, 2009 -shortly after the release of the Munyaneza judgment -the RCMP arrested Jacques Mungwarere in Windsor, Ontario. He was the second person charged under the CAHWCA, this time with two counts of genocide and two counts of crimes against humanity for allegedly participating in the killing of Tutsi in Kibuye. 134 The same review also noted that the program's relatively low budget of CDN$15.6 million -which is the same budget amount since the program's inception in 1998, and, therefore, a shrinking budget, due to inflation -has restricted the program's ability to undertake prosecutions, which are far more expensive (at $6 million) than the remedies of denial of visas ($6,280) In sum, Canada has made a significant contribution to the development of international criminal law through the adoption of its groundbreaking CAHWCA. The CAHWCA allows Canada to prosecute individuals who have committed serious international crimes and also serves as a guide to others on how the Rome Statute might be fully implemented into domestic law. Canada has also set a positive precedent in its successful domestic prosecution under the CAHWCA in Munyaneza. It has made strides in applying administrative remedies to modern-day serious crimes. However, with increased political and financial support, it could do more, thereby truly "sending a strong message to Canadians and the international community that the Government of Canada does not tolerate impunity." Canada's most energetic and progressive period in the development of international criminal law took place from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. It then stepped back from this role somewhat for political and legal reasons: a change in government, a shrinking budget within the domestic War Crimes Program and a significant loss in a criminal prosecution. Even so, Canada's past steps position it well to once again become an international criminal justice innovator -not to replicate the past, but to be responsive to current priorities. It can do so in three main ways.
First, it can and should strengthen Canada's domestic War Crimes Program by increasing the budget enough to permit the launching of one prosecution every two to three years and to increase staff resources for administrative remedies, such as visa review and refugee exclusion monitoring. Maintaining the very real potential for prosecutions along with active administrative remedies would significantly raise the profile of Canada's no safe haven policy, here and abroad. In so doing, increasing transparency for victims on how to communicate with, and be updated by, the program would also be important. On a related note, the program has developed some excellent practices: while program employees have shared these practices with other countries and entities in the past, 143 dedicated funding should be provided to allow program employees to share expertise more often by conducting international training projects (in particular with other ICC states parties to promote complementarity). Also from a domestic perspective, the federal government should adopt the regulations required to make the Crimes Against Humanity Fund operational.
Second, Canada should consider appointing a focal point, such as an ambassador-at-large or an envoy, on international criminal justice issues to consolidate and coordinate Canada's foreign policy voice in this realm.
144 Doing so would amplify Canada's impact in international criminal justice on the international stage.
Finally, Canada should continue demonstrating its support for international criminal justice through coordinated and sustained actions across the international criminal justice spectrum. These actions include continuing or establishing financial, legal and/or political support for initiatives that boost accountability responses (for example, Justice Rapid Response and evidence-gathering organizations, such as the UN Commissions of Inquiry and the IIIM), institutions that preserve and protect past gains in international criminal law (such as the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone and the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals) and viable new and established independent international, regional and localized justice mechanisms meeting human rights standards. This effort would include easing somewhat Canada's position on the ICC budget, so as to permit some growth in the ICC's response to an increasing caseload, while still ensuring the efficient use of funds.
Criminal prosecutions, the rule of law, reconciliation and secure transitions to peace are undeniably linked. Current and future ICC, regional and domestic prosecutions, and current and future tribunals benefit from foreign policy approaches that understand and reflect this complexity. These steps would reinforce the constructive advances made by Canada at the domestic and international levels while, at the same time, international criminal justice faces ever-greater challenges in the form of protracted armed conflicts, state noncooperation, state resistance to norms of individual responsibility and the rise of destructive nationalism and terrorism linked to conflicts. There is, indeed, a valuable role for Canada to play in the future development of international criminal law. CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen's University Press (mqup.ca) and can be found in better bookstores and through online book retailers.
